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Insurance companies will pay out an estimated $50 billion in claims as a result of 
the September 11,2001 terrorist attacks. The enormous consequences of the attacks to 
both the local and national economy surprised many and have raised concerns about the 
cost of such events. Predicting the occurrence and economic cost of terrorist attacks is 
fundamentally different than predicting the occurrence and economic cost of natural 
disasters. The cost of natural disasters is more predictable and often can be accurately 
estimated using historical data. Even losses from typical kinds of crime such as burglary 
show predictable patterns.
Both the frequency of and the magnitude of cost events are typically thought to 
approximate a bell-shaped curve, with the high point of the curve representing usual or 
customary loss. Occasionally, an infrequent event will occur near the tail of the curve, 
but these are the exceptions. Even when a tail-event occurs, typically there is no 
conscious design to make the event’s damage more severe. In stark contrast, a terrorist 
event, however, does not follow predictable patterns. In addition, when damage does 
occur, the damage is purposely designed to be a tail-event, although terrorists, like all
humans, occasionally fail, but the cost distribution can be expected to exhibit pronounced 
kurtosis.
Since the events of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, more attention has 
been focused on the economic consequences of terrorism. This research explores the 
legal and economic issues of estimating the cost of a terrorist threat. The primary focus 
of the research concerns a threat to a large public venue such as a convention 
center/arena. Estimating the cost of a terrorist threat in this context is a multidisciplinary 
effort involving, at a minimum, economists, accountants, lawyers, and experts on 
security/terrorism.
Grateful recognition is given to my Supervisory Committee Chairman 
Michael J. O’Hara, J.D., Ph.D. 
and to committee members 
Graham Mitenko, Ph.D.
Keith Turner, Ph.D. 
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patience in completion of this thesis.
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1INTRODUCTION
There are many types of risks to which businesses are exposed and every business 
should consider the possibility of and subsequent cost associated with each potential risk. 
Some risks are commonly understood and in some cases expected, for example, legal 
suits, theft, and vandalism. All commonly encountered risks are insurable and thus allow 
management of risk to be a predictable expense. In this regard, few industries have 
become as adept in predicting future loss potential than the insurance industry. The 
management of risk for most businesses is enhanced by their knowledge o f historical 
patterns of risk. As historical patterns change, especially when change is quick, the 
science of prediction becomes more difficult.
The Insurance Services Office (ISO) notes:
In the nine years and ten months from January 1989 to October 
1998, the United States property/casualty insurance industry suffered an 
inflation-adjusted $98.0 billion in catastrophic losses -  101.2% more than 
the inflation-adjusted $48.7 billion in catastrophic losses during the 39 
years from January 1950 to December 1988 (Insurance Services Office 
1999)”.'
As can be seen, historical loss patterns are increasing sharply. These losses 
primarily are accrued from natural disasters, such as hurricane Hugo in 1989, the 
Northridge earthquake in 1994, and hurricanes Andrew and Iniki in 1992.2 Historically, 
property/casualty catastrophic loss primarily has been associated with acts of nature. The
ISO is an independent company that provides risk decision products and services for the insurance 
industry. Their website is located at: 
http://www.iso.com
The same report discussed above also notes ISO defines catastrophes as events that cause $25 million or 
more in direct insured losses to property and that affect a significant number of insureds and insurers.
2 Some in the insurance industry believe that weather related natural disasters are increasing both in
frequency and in intensity because of human action induced global warming.
2rise in terrorist activity against the United States, culminating in the September 11, 2001 
al Quaida attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC) and Pentagon using airliners-as-
• * 3missiles, is changing that view.
The 9-11 event is referred to many times in this research, but it is important to 
note there is little a building owner (public or private) can do to prevent the style of 
catastrophic incident that 9-11 exemplifies (Archibald, Jamison et al. 2002). Prevention 
measures of this kind can only be done by the federal government. The 9-11 event, 
nevertheless, serves as an example of the consequences experienced when insufficient 
prevention occurs.
Until 9-11, examples of other recent notable terrorist attacks on American soil 
include the 1993 basement garage truck bombing of the WTC and the 1995 street truck 
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. These events, in 
combination with other al Quaida attacks overseas, and especially 9-11, have heightened 
awareness of problems associated with catastrophic risk, especially those resulting from 
acts of terror.
This research considers the cost implications for an economic entity facing a 
terroristic threat. The nexus of the problem is risk quantification. How, specifically, 
does an economic entity, public or private, estimate the cost of a terrorist threat? The
3 The September 11, 2001 WTC and Pentagon attacks will be referred to as “9-11” in this research.
The al Quaida is a terrorist organization with no defined central location but having many cells scattered 
around the world. The al Quaida springs from the fundamentalist portion of Islam and is particularly 
concerned with Western influences on the Muslim world. A fourth plane hijacked by al Quaida, with a 
target now believed to be the USA Capitol Building, was crashed in Pennsylvania as an unfortunate 
consequence of the passenger’s rescue attempts. According to an Associated Press article printed in the 
09/09/02 evening edition of the Omaha World Herald newspaper, 2,801 people are either dead or missing 
as a result of the WTC attack alone.
3problem of cost estimation can be viewed from the vantage point of an economic entity 
who has just received a threat and subsequently is trying to predict pending cost, or from 
the vantage point of an entity who has already survived a threat and now is trying to 
capture cost ex post. Regardless o f the strength of an objective attempt to estimate cost 
ex ante or ex post, subjectivity is unavoidable. This research considers both ex ante and 
ex post cost estimation issues, although is primarily concerned with the former.
There are seemingly endless examples of economic entities which could be used 
to focus such a discussion. Since most terroristic threats, however, tend to be directed 
toward so-called landmark structures having social and political significance, used by a 
large number of people, and being of significant economic importance, this research will 
use a convention center/arena (CC/A) as the focal point for discussion.4 The general 
question is: "What is the cost of a terroristic threat?”. To be more instructive, I 
specifically append “ to a CC/A” at the end of the previous question.
CC/As, by the nature of their business, act as hosts for the general public, additional cost issues 
arise that can be used for illustration and expanded discussion.
4PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
MACRO VIEW OF TERRORIST IMPACTS 
GDP Impacts
Calculating the total economic impact of an event like 9-11 is complicated by the 
vastness and diversity of damage to the economy. In addition to obvious direct costs, like 
physical damage, there are a number of indirect costs. Consider productivity costs as an 
example. These costs may include (but certainly are not limited to) handling extra 
paperwork, stricter access requirements, additional employee drills, training, and 
counseling. These new indirect costs erode profits. Many of these costs can be hidden 
from traditional measures of the economy. Another subtle source of economic loss is the 
postponement of investment decisions. After 9-11, the expected rate of return for many 
projects probably went down as a result of security costs both to the specific project and 
the broader economy.
The difficulty in objectively measuring the impact can be seen by observing the 
wide variance in cost estimates of the attacks. A simple Internet search produces 
numerous estimates that vary in the billions of dollars. Part of the problem is determining 
what, exactly, should be included in the measure. How many indirect costs should be 
included? For example, should cost of an economic stimulus package be included?
Osama bin Laden, the titular head o f al Quaida and wayward ascetic son of a 
Yameni construction magnate who made billions serving the Saudi Royal Family, is 
widely quoted as estimating the cost of 9-11 at SI trillion. The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), however, often is quoted as estimating the total impact, both direct and
5indirect at 0.75% of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) or $76.5 billion.5 According to U.S. 
Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill, the lack of available terrorism insurance for U.S. 
businesses is beginning to impact the broader economy with a cost equal to 1% of the 
gross domestic product (Kopecki 2002).6 The cost of terrorism is often expressed as a 
percent of GDP, and as such implies a reoccurring nature. In fact, when comparing 
disparate estimates of damage, care must be taken to establish the width of time frame 
used. For example, The Comptroller o f New York estimates the total impact o f the WTC 
attacks to New York City to be as much as $95 billion, but extends the loss period to the 
end o f2004 (Thompson 2002).
As time passes, the cost of terrorism may become a more specific, line-item entry 
in both national and business budgets.
Impacted Industries
Dramatic economic problems often have a rippling effect causing impact to the 
broader economy. Even events given much less coverage than 9-11, like the corporate 
accounting scandals o f2001 and 2002 can have profound impacts.7 When Enron
5 The IMF website is located at:
http://www.imf.orig/
ABC News Online discusses the report in more detail. 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/business/2001/12/item20011228201738 l.htm
http://www.pe.eom/n; 
Visited 20 July 2002.
6announced it had overstated earnings in November 2001, share price dropped under $4
from a high over $90, thus erasing billions in shareholder equity and retirement accounts.
The Enron accounting debacle is widely considered to be part of the reason for the stock
market pullback that started in January and February 2002. The profoundly higher cost
of 9-11 make it hard to imagine an economic entity not impacted. There are,
nevertheless, some businesses with more severe impacts.
The entire hospitality industry was/is among the most severely impacted, and
within this industry subset, perhaps the airline industry was the hardest hit. When
regulators closed off air travel for four days, the airline industry lost nearly $1.5 billion
(Reynolds 2002). A working paper from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis concisely
summarizes the problem.
The events of 9/11 curtailed airline travel in various ways. First, these 
events reduced the demand for air travel as a result of the increased 
concerns about safety. Second, these events reduced air travel by 
exacerbating the mild recession that began in March 2001. Third, the cost 
of travel was effectively increased because of the necessity of arriving 
earlier for departures and the increased delays because of security 
breaches. The result was substantially less air travel for both work and 
leisure purposes (Coughlin, Cohen et al. 2002).
Coughlin, et al., goes on to note a dramatic 30% drop in revenue passenger miles during
September 2001 as compared to the previous September, and traffic was still down 15%
year-over-year in December 2001. The losses were not transient. The world's largest
airline, AMR, the parent of American Airlines, posted a second quarter 2002 loss of $495
million and expected to be in the red for some time. Compared with the same quarter of
2001, revenues for the quarter were off 20%, passenger traffic was off 11%, and
American Airline's average fares were off 9.5% (McCartney 2002).
7The decline experienced by the airline industry is just part of the broader impacts 
to the hospitality industry. The head of the NYC & Company, (the name for the 
Convention and Visitors Bureau in New York), said the official post-9-11 forecast of 
visitors to New York included a 14% drop (5.4 million people) in 2001 as compared to 
2000. Also forecasted is a corresponding drop in spending o f 12% or $2.1 billion (NYC 
& Company 2001).
A national survey of hotel general managers by Cornell University indicated more 
than a third of general managers noted a decline in average room rates, and 42.7% had 
experienced group cancellations due to the events of 9-11. The general managers 
perceived a declining hotel market even before the attacks, which made the 9-11 impacts 
even more severe. All of the general managers responding to the survey said they had 
laid off employees (Taylor and Enz 2002). A more recent analysis of the hotel industry 
by Pricewaterhouse-Coopers, a New York consulting group, postponed the hotel industry 
recovery until 2004 due to continuing stock market declines and lingering travel jitters 
[from 9-11] (Bannon 2002).
The Travel Business Roundtable o f  Leading Economic Indicators declined at a 
seasonally-adjusted rate of 8.4% after 9-11, and the drop is noted as the most significant 
monthly drop this index has experienced (Travel Business Roundtable 2001).8 According 
to industry analyst, Rob Reynolds, tour operators experienced a 60% decline in travel 
bookings after 9-11 (Reynolds 2002).
8 The Travel Business Roundtable is an independent organization whose purpose is to educate,
especially legislative leaders, regarding issues important to the travel and tourism industry. The cited 
report is one of many statistics they produce. The Travel Business Roundtable Website is located at. 
http://www.tbr.org/
8The restaurant business also suffered. A news release from the National 
Restaurant Association reported the overall negative impact o f 9-11 to eating and 
drinking businesses as exceeding $1 billion in September 2001 (National Restaurant 
Association 2002). The release goes on to note, however, by November, monthly sales 
volume returned to pre-attack levels while total employment remained below pre-9-11 
levels.
All o f the hospitality impacts discussed above are particularly important within 
the context of a Convention Center/Arena (CC/A). If we assume the patronage of a 
CC/A to be composed of both local and regional business, common sense dictates an 
expected, more-severe impact to the regional component when the overall hospitality 
industry experiences a shock like 9-11. As an example, consider one of the main staples 
of a CC/A: tradeshows.
Tradeshow Week maintains detailed statistics regarding the tradeshow industry 
which they publish in their Quarterly Report o f  Tradeshow Statistics. Their third-quarter 
2001 report (containing the 9-11 event), indicated the largest decrease ever recorded in 
the 29-year history of the report (Tradeshow Week 2001). According to the report, 
professional attendance was the hardest hit, down 7.5% compared with 2000 figures. 
Exhibiting company participation and net square footage also dropped. This record 
decrease was immediately broken by the fourth-quarter statistics when professional 
attendance dropped 20.4% from the same period in 2000 {Tradeshow Week 2002). 
Dramatic decreases in the airline and hotel industry translate into dramatic declines for
9the tradeshow business which, in turn, represent a significant component o f CC/A 
revenue.
Lifestyle Impacts
Shortly after 9-11, numerous commentators were quick to note the American 
lifestyle will forever be changed by the event. More people, for example, now are 
nervous about staying in high-rise lodging establishments, and when they do stay, they 
request a low floor by an exit (Kelly 2002). In like manner, the anthrax-infected letters 
anonymously sent to members of Congress and the media shortly after 9-11 were widely 
reported as making people afraid to open their mail, or to send their children to school. 
The changes in lifestyle resulting from a terrorist act are numerous.
One of the problems with dollar-value measurement of damage is the inability to 
accurately capture adverse lifestyle impacts, especially emotional impacts. While there 
may be universal agreement an event like 9-11 causes profound and widespread 
emotional trauma, how that trauma is costed on an individual basis, and subsequently 
summed to create a total, is more a matter of conjecture than science. The individual 
impacts are, nevertheless, present. Rand Corp did a survey shortly after the 9-11 attacks 
asking participants qualitative questions typically used to evaluate stress level9. They 
found 90% percent of adults surveyed experienced at least some degree of stress, and 
44% reported a substantial level o f a post-traumatic stress symptom (Schuster, Stein et al. 
2001).
Questions asked by Rand attempted to qualitatively measure such things as disturbing memories 
of the event, reduced ability to concentrate, trouble sleeping, and irritability.
10
The problem of measuring emotional discomfort is similar to the problem of
measuring loss of enjoyment or pleasure. The crux of this problem is highlighted in the
hedonic damages debate. Hedonic damage measurement essentially is an attempt to
measure the value of a human life.10 Those purporting such a value is measurable
typically use some indirect measure, e.g., finding what some economic entity spends to
avoid a casualty. In the context of providing expert witness testimony on economic
damages, Martin does an excellent job in pointing out the flaws with this approach.
Unfortunately, the range of values is so large as to be nearly without 
value. The Consumer Product Safety Commission values life at $70,000 
while the Food and Drug Administration sets it at $132,000,000. A range 
such as this is absolutely worthless to a jury, so most economists [who 
support the belief hedonic damages can be measured] do not include these 
two studies in their examples, but put the range somewhere between $1 
and $8 million (Martin and Vavoulis 2002).
Applying a specific dollar value to human life raises another philosophical problem. For
any specific, agreed-upon value, there is an implication that the reasonable person would
be immediately willing to give up his/her life for that sum of money. Common sense
dictates a rational person would not give up their life for any sum of money.11
Lastly, many economists believe a market is required to perform the
measurement.12 Without a market, there are no measures, only estimates of what the
market would yield. According to these economists, without a market measure, an expert
opinion is dubious at best. This is not meant to suggest consideration of hedonic
Hedonic damage is a distinct measure of the loss of life, itself, and not to be confused with other 
kinds of loss, such as loss of consortium or pain and suffering.
11 This leaves open the notion rational people are willing to die in certain circumstances, e.g. to 
defend a loved one or closely held belief. While money may be a significant factor in justifying such 
sacrifice, money is not either the sole or the primary cause of the sacrifice.
12 A market is an institution or mechanism which brings together buyers (“demanders”) and sellers 
(“suppliers”) of particular goods and services (McConnell and Brue, 1993).
11
damages is always without merit. To illustrate, note that the U.S.A. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) often conducts benefit/cost analysis regarding new drugs. If the 
FDA approves a new drug which includes the rare possibility of a death, then the FDA 
essentially has valued the death at the level of benefit. This administrative agency use of 
legislative power is not the same as economist's expert opinion. An economic expert 
witness assists the judicial trier of fact because economic theory and tools of analysis 
provide a gain in precision. If  the issue in question is substantially subjective, rather than 
objective, then the issue belongs within the ken of the jury. Hedonic damages can be 
wholly appropriate for the FDA and simultaneously wholly inappropriate for an 
economic expert in a courtroom.
Examples of Economic Impact From a Terrorist Threat
Two high-profile sporting events occurred shortly after 9-11, Super Bowl XXXVI 
and the 2002 Winter Olympics13. Both examples are at once good and bad examples for 
use in discussing the cost of a terrorist threat. They are good in the sense they highlight 
the enormity of spending required to secure a geographically and physically large venue. 
They are bad examples because both events are so hugely profiled as to make them far 
more attractive to terrorists than regular CC/A-like venues in ordinary operations, and as 
such, require disproportional higher levels of protection. Both events were prominent 
enough to be designated as National Special Security Events (NSSE).14 The secrecy
13 Super Bowl XXXVI was held on February 3, 2002 in New Orleans, Louisiana. The 2002 Winter 
Olympics opened on February 8, 2002 in Salt Lake City, Utah.
14 National Special Security Events may be designated under Title 18 of the United States Code. 
Such a designation allows the Secret Service to help with security. There only have been a dozen NSSE 
designations since the legislation was enacted. For online access to the Federal Register go to: 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/su docs/aces/aces 140.html
12
surrounding the security of NSSE events precludes getting accurate security spending 
information. The cost of these security efforts may have been significantly defrayed by 
the United States government.
The previous caveats not withstanding, the cost of providing security for Super 
Bowl XXXVI was rumored to be approximately double that o f Super Bowl XXXV. Milt 
Ahlerich, the NFL’s vice president of security, for example, was quoted as saying 
spending was more than double what was spent in the past (Powers 2002).15 One article 
puts the total security cost of Super Bowl XXXVI at $40 million, although the article is 
not clear whether this includes the cost o f Secret Service help (Horrow 2002). The 
rumored doubling of spending is at least partially substantiated by New Orleans Mayor 
Marc Morial who hinted the 600 police officers on hand was double those on hand for the 
Super Bowl in 1997 (Bell 2002).
Security at the 2002 Winter Olympics was reported to cost $310 million, and was 
nearly three times what the Atlanta organizers spent on security in 1996 for the Summer 
Olympics, even though the Summer Olympics had four times as many athletes and events 
(Zeigler 2002). As with Super Bowl XXXVT, it is unclear whether NSSE support is 
included in this cost. Needless to say, the staggering security costs discussed above 
would loom largely on a balance sheet.
Overseeing the security for a single event or a series o f events with a fixed 
duration may involve less security expense than if the economic entity were ongoing.
The United States Postal Service, for example, suffered severe and ongoing losses from
15 The article is not clear whether Ahlerich refers to the most recent past, or to games several years 
past.
13
the 9-11 and post-9-11 anthrax attacks. Postmaster General John Potter advised Congress 
the cost would be about $2 billion in lost revenues and $3 billion for anthrax cleanup and 
sanitation equipment (Kestin 2001). There is undoubtedly a reoccurring component to 
these costs.
UNDERSTANDING THE TERRORIST RISK 
The Source of Risk
A detailed root cause analysis o f terrorism is beyond the scope of this work, 
however, a short, high-level review of theory may be helpful to understand forces that 
predictably change the potential for terrorist acts. Research on terrorism can be focused 
at different levels:
In much of the existing research on terrorism, explanations have focused 
on the individual and group level. These aim primarily at providing 
psychological explanations, such as identifying why individuals join a 
terrorist group. Explanations at the societal or national level primarily 
attempt to identify causal relationships between certain historical, cultural 
and socio-political characteristics of society and the occurrence of 
terrorism. Explanations at the systemic or international level seek to 
establish causal relationships between characteristics of the international 
state system and relations between states on the one hand, and the 
occurrence of international terrorism on the other (Lia and Hansen 2000).
When reduced to simplest form, those inclined to commit terrorist acts often, but not
always, are motivated by economic disparity, political difference, and/or ideological
difference.16 Terrorism inspired out of ideological difference often is considered the
most dangerous because ideologically-motivated terrorists typically are less constrained
When so motivated the terrorist's terrorism can not accomplish the desired objective directly (e.g., 
terrorism does not redistribute wealth). Instead, the terrorism must unravel the existing social fabric on the 
hope that the reconstructed social fabric will be more consistent with the terrorist's objective (e.g., 
ideological purity) While social fabric is plastic in nature, quite often it is spun from a thread with a very 
resilient memory.
14
by fear of mass casualties or the euphemistically-labeled collateral damage. As with all 
maneuvers in war, terrorism is about leveraging limited assets into effective pressure 
(Sun-tzu 1994). The terrorist defines "collateral damage" differently than the traditional 
army: but both seek to minimize it.17 Effective pressure for the terrorist often is 
measured by fundamental political change. Thus, the terrorist actively seeks to maximize 
what a traditional army would label "collateral damage" both to tie down that army and to 
stimulate the political processes to accede to the terrorist's worldview.
Modem society also has unintentionally made terrorism easier by providing a 
high-tech environment where communication, travel, and shared sources of knowledge 
are more easily attained.18 The latter can be used to gather intelligence regarding a 
possible target and to create or procure weapons. Ease of communication is meant to 
include not only personal communication,19 but also the modem media which devotes 
massive and immediate publicity to terrorist acts. An article written about mass media 
coverage of 9-11 reports, polls and surveys indicated between 99% and 100% of all
A modem traditional army may deliberately seek, in some contexts, what is traditionally defined 
as collateral damage. A modem army first seeks to eliminate the command and control (C&C) structure of 
the opponent army. The opponent army's C&C structure almost always is interdependent with the civilian 
infrastructure. Eliminating the opponent army's C&C supply of electricity typically has as an immediate 
and predictable consequence the termination of pumping facilities for the urban water supply. This was 
seen in Baghdad, Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War. Additionally, a modem army may deliberately decimate 
the civilian infrastructure so as to prevent that civilian population from resupplying the opponent army 
and/or to force the opponent army to divert its existing supplies towards the civilian population. This was 
seen in General Sherman's 1864-1865 March through Georgia and South Carolina during the USA's Civil 
War.
18 Of course, to some extent, the technology of modem society also has provided better means of 
detecting and thwarting terrorist acts. It remains to be seen whether the gain in defensive detection is 
greater than, equal to, or less than the gains in the facilitation of terrorist action frequency and magnitude of 
consequence. However, history teaches that every defense can be defeated.
19 Proponents of surveillance insist that such surveillance must be effective to the task. However, 
surveillance that can detect nefarious plots also, of necessity, tramples upon the privacy of the innocent and 
the formerly free. The terrorist who seeks a closed society "wins" just by prompting this defensive 
measure.
15
Americans followed initial news of the attacks (Nacos 2002)20 With regard to 9-11, the 
media not only provided round-the-clock coverage of the disaster itself, but also gave air 
time to Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants via videotapes made available through the 
independent Middle Eastern television network Al-Jazeera. Many other U.S.A. domestic 
TV programs aired having a “why do they hate us” theme. As can be seen, terrorists use 
the media as a free and easy platform to promote their views.
Terrorist Groups
At the time of this writing during the year 2002, ideologically-focused terrorist
groups based in the Middle East are considered the most likely source for potential
terrorist acts, although historically many disparate groups having different motivations
and operating in different countries also have used terrorism to advance their goals.21
Middle Eastern groups include:
Hizballah, a radical Shia Islamic Group in Lebanon that has committed 
numerous anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli attacks; HAMAS (Islamic Resistance 
Movement) and the Palestine Islamic Jihad, both of which use terrorism in 
the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israeli in order to undermine Middle East 
peace negotiations and to establish an Islamic Palestinian state; the Abu 
Sayyaf Group, which is a radical Islamic Separatist group operating in the 
southern Philippines; Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group), which is 
based in Egypt and seeks the overthrow of the Egyptian government; and 
the Armed Islamic Group, which is based in Algeria and seeks to 
overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state 
(Simon 2002).
20 The article appeared in the Spring 2002 quarterly publication of Phi Kappa Phi. Phi Kappa Phi is 
an honorary society whose stated purpose is the recognition and encouragement of superior scholarship in 
all fields of study.
21 Examples from the U.S.A. domestic front include the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and the 
Animal Liberation Front which is the radical splinter from PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals). Many, especially is the Muslim Middle East, would point to the post World War II creation of 
the State of Israel as a successful use of terrorism for political gain.
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The religious fundamentalism of the typical Middle Eastern terrorist organizations 
poses a more likely threat to CC/As and their venues for at least two reasons. First, 
terrorist groups domestic to the United States typically are more cause or issue-focused, 
such as environmental protection, animal rights, or anti-abortion activism. The targets of 
a cause-motivated terrorist typically are highly specific and symbolic, e.g., a chemical 
plant or an abortion clinic. Unless a CC/A is a venue hosting a targeted cause, the 
likelihood of attack from these terrorist groups is low. Second, one of the professed 
targets of religiously-motivated Middle Eastern terrorists groups is the American 
entertainment industry. The ideology of these terrorists regards the entertainment 
industry as decadent and sinful.
The Role of Ideology in Terrorist’s Target Selection22
Acts of terrorism are often referred to as indiscriminate or random. That is true 
with respect to the perception of the attacked populace, but most often it is not random 
with respect to the attacking terrorist. Terrorists almost always choose targets whose 
destruction is warranted by the ideology of the terrorist and whose destruction is 
perceived beneficial to their cause. The terrorist act is random in the sense terrorists 
often do not know who their specific victims will be.23
Ideology is a dominant factor behind most terrorist attacks. Through ideology 
victims of terrorist acts are dehumanized in the mind of the terrorist, as the terrorist either 
blames them as the source of the terrorist’s plight, or an aid to someone who is.
22 The material in this section borrows heavily from an article written by C. J. Drake (2002).
23 Military across the globe recognize that the ability to kill is enhanced if the target is dehumanized 
as the hated Other instead of a specific and known human.
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According to terrorist’s ideology, the victims’ alleged guilt merits punishment, and 
simultaneously absolves the terrorist of any wrongdoing.
Most terrorist ideologies are sufficiently stringent as to apply blame to anyone or 
any thing even marginally associated with the target24 So, for example, a construction 
worker helping to build an entertainment facility is already “guilty by association,” and as 
such a justifiable target in the mind the terrorist. Using this example, also note the 
desirability o f the construction worker as a target may be enhanced because this target is 
probably less hardened than the specific object of the terrorist’s wrath.
Summary of Recent Terrorist Acts
Appendix A contains information in graphical form regarding the frequency, 
location, and intended target of terrorist attacks.25 Although the perceived threat of 
terrorism has risen substantially since 9-11, recent historical statistics regarding terrorism 
are less ominous. During the five-year period beginning in 1995 and ending in 2000, 
there were only fifteen terrorist attacks in North America and only seven casualties.26 
Internationally, 77 United States citizens were killed during the period and 651 were 
wounded. Although 9-11 certainly skewed the casualty figures, numerically speaking, 
the odds of a terrorist attack to most U.S.A. located businesses as based on historical 
statistics are slim.
24 During the U.S. A.'s racial unrest of the 1960's, the Black Panther leader H. Rap Brown noted: "If 
you aren't part of the solution, then you are part of the problem." as well as "Violence is as American as 
apple pie." In 2002, H. Rap Brown, then living under the post-conversion name of Jamil Abdullah Al- 
Amin, was convicted of murder of a police officer.
25 The data in this section were obtained from the United States Department of State located at: 
http://www.state. gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/245 l.htm
26 Note that these dates exclude al Quaida's first attack on the WTC (i.e., basement truck bomb), but 
include its attacks on the American embassies in Africa. Also see Appendix A for data and graphs.
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MEASUREMENT PROBLEMS 
A11 Threats Are Not the Same
Quantification of the cost of a threat depends heavily on quantification of the 
threat itself. The concept of quantifying threats will be discussed in more detail in a later 
section, but for now, note a high-level classification of threat potential would consider 
whether the threat was routine (or unspecified), indirect, or direct.
When preparing to quantify the cost of a terroristic threat, it may be reasonable to 
include the routine cost of protection. Economic entities routinely budget for security 
threats, even in the absence of a direct threat. This implies a constant, nonspecific level 
of threat is always present. Since 9-11, the concept of routine has changed. Routine now 
and in the future is more, perhaps much more, than routine before 9-11.
A routine security budget is composed of those security expenditures common to 
most businesses. With regard to a CC/A, many expenditures are considered boiler plate 
and would vary in size only with prevailing general perceptions o f threat potential. 
Quantifying the cost of such a routine threat in this circumstance likely is easier than 
when the threat is more specific, because of the assumption of minimal impact to revenue 
streams. When the threat is routine (i.e. vague or unspecified), the cost of a threat may 
roughly be computed by subtracting last year’s security budget from the current year’s 
budget.
The situation gets more complicated when the threat is more specific. Since 9-11, 
for example, the United States government has issued several indirect warnings regarding 
the possibility o f a terrorist attack. These warnings only specify a category of target (e.g.,
19
bridges). In like manner, a possibility exists a generalized, indirect threat could be issued 
to CC/A’s in general, but to none in specific. In this indirect scenario, security spending 
by CC/A’s presumably would rise disproportionately to entertainment/business facilities 
in general, and there may be additional impacts in the form of lost business. Obviously, a 
direct threat, leveled at a specific CC/A, would precipitate the most security spending, as 
well as impact revenue streams.
The amount of spending required to meet a threat also depends, at a minimum, on 
the terrorist or terrorist organization alleged to be the perpetrator, the credibility o f the 
source reporting the threat, and whether or not significant free help is available from 
government sources.27 The former gives insight whether the terrorist threat has the 
required resources and expertise available to carry out the threat.
Additional Economic Impact Contingents
A major determinate of what an economic entity will spend to defend against a 
terrorist threat is the consequence of what would happen if insufficient spending occurs. 
With regard to a CC/A, insufficient security spending after a credible security threat 
becomes known may result in a reduction in event bookings and attendance as people 
avoid the facility because of safety concerns.28 Reductions in security conceivably 
increase the chances of a terrorist act, and in the event one occurs, damage to reputation 
and future business may be large and unrecoverable. The potential for civil damages also 
are present. As consequences become more profound, the potential for greater cost
27 Note security provided by the government is not free, but rather becomes a taxpayer-born 
externality to the economic entity receiving it.
28 Safety concerns include not only personal safety concerns but also concerns about the hassles 
caused by increased security, e.g., baggage checks and longer lines at gates.
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increases. How much cost increases is a function of how risk averse the entity is, which 
is a determinate of security spending. Of course, as with any discounted present value 
analysis, those costs or revenues that are recognized earlier in time will have a far greater 
impact on the present value of profitability. Additionally, when those remote in time 
events also are small probability events, then the present value analysis o f profitability 
nearly will eliminate those costs from the calculation of profit.
A second factor to consider is the kind of event the terrorist has either threatened 
to use or is presumed to use. According to the renowned billionaire investor Warren 
Buffet29, who has substantial investments in the reinsurance industry, the most likely risk 
is terrorists introducing a biological agent into the ventilation system of a large office 
building (Shim 2002).30 Buffet also notes insurance companies now are excluding such 
risks, as well as nuclear and chemical risks. The perception of likely risk from these 
sources is a departure from what history would teach. Terrorists typically have used 
bombs, arson, and armed attack as their primary tools of destruction. Today, however, 
may be a new day with new risks.
Thirdly, terrorist’s targets differ with respect to hardness. An entity consisting 
mostly of intellectual property (IP) faces fewer of the traditional security issues than a 
brick and mortar concern, especially if the latter occupies a large amount of space and
Warren Buffet is the CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, a large holding company. Berkshire 
Hathaway’s website is at: 
http: //www.berkshirehathawav. com/
30 Note that some forms of modem terrorism do not include the destructive physical damage 
associated with bombs and arson. Bioterror attacks and hacking attacks to IT (Information Technology) 
resources leave physical plant intact but still generate significant psychological effect and/or financial 
effect.
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handles large numbers of people.31 The relative hardness of the target can act as a 
deterrent to terrorists. Note, however, hardening further skews the expected negative 
outcome by reducing the frequency of low loss events.
Measuring Economic Impacts
Whatever negative impact results from a terrorist threat, the measurement of the 
impact is no simple task. Typically, when a large business or other economic entity 
experiences an economic loss, the measurement of that loss is a multidisciplinary effort. 
Gaughan writes:
The skills o f an economist may be invaluable to analyze the relevant 
economic environment, do an industry analysis, and construct reliable 
projections. A finance expert may be necessary to analyze relevant 
variables from financial markets, such as rates of return. An accountant 
may be useful to conduct a costs analysis or to perform other work, such 
as the reconstruction of financial statements, including cash flow 
statements (Gaughan 2000).
In addition to economists, finance experts, and accountants, there also may be a 
need for a marketing expert and a lawyer when determining economic damages. 
Marketing experts have knowledge useful in predicting public response to advertising 
(e.g., as required to offset a negative event), and, to some extent, what response is likely 
to ensue from negative stimuli. With regard to lawyers, if final establishment of damage 
requires the use of the court system, then the entity must note methods and assumptions 
used in the determination o f economic damages may vary between legal jurisdictions and 
are often subject to interpretation. For example, some jurisdictions permit recovery to the 
estate while others limit recovery to dependent survivors (Martin and Vavoulis 2002).
31 Of course, IP embedded in an Internet context can be reduced in value via hacking.
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Requirements like this directly impact the potential size of losses an economic entity may 
face. If the determination of losses becomes the purview of a court, strict rules regarding 
the use of scientific evidence are required. A detailed analysis of each discipline’s role 
follows in the next section.
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
VALUATION IS A MULTIDISCIPLINARY EFFORT 
The Accounting Profession
People unfamiliar with valuation issues often assume accounting to be solely 
sufficient to quantify changes in valuation. Accountants are an important part of the 
process, but have limitations. Accountants do not try to capture all costs and 
consequently do not capture all costs. The accounting profession focuses upon objective 
value, principally derived from transactions. Unless there is a cash flow (or a cost-based 
non-cash flow, as in the case of depreciation) resulting from some market transaction, 
accountants make no entry on a balance sheet. The strength of the accounting approach 
is that it predictably produces the same result regardless o f the condition under which the 
entity is being valued. An economic entity, for example, may be valued as going concern 
value, stock market value, or for merger/acquisition value, and this implies the potential 
for a differing valuation estimates (Sullivan 2000). As the tenants of valuation move 
further from objective measures, accountants are less likely to measure.
The Finance Profession
The finance profession, likewise, searches for objective value and often finds 
valuation to be insufficiently objective. Finance also focuses upon objective value, 
especially quantifiable items of concern, like price, share, and cash flow. An example of 
the fringe of sufficiently objective value is the value estimated for the control of an entity 
versus minority ownership of the entity. Conventional wisdom holds acceptable the 
addition of a so-called control premium in the valuation process (Abrams 2001).
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Measuring the control premium is beyond the scope of both the typical accountant and 
typical financial advisor. Unlike accounting, however, finance will welcome the use of 
statistical measures when the firm does not individually engage in a transaction.
The Economic Profession
Economists see value in yet another manner, and notably include subjective 
sources of value. Economists examine the utility of an item, initially measured in utils, 
but then exchanged for currency and most often measured in dollars. Economists view 
utility as the stream of current and future benefits resulting from ownership of a good or 
property. This stream o f objective and subjective benefits is then converted into current 
dollars. "Forensic economics" is a specialty field within economics, accounting, and 
finance whose goal is to find changes in value often not in the scope of other business 
disciplines, such as placing a value on control of an enterprise (Mitenko and Okleshen 
1998). A forensic economist is commonly employed when someone or something has 
wrongfully impaired the income producing potential of an asset, and, as such, is 
appropriate in the context o f a terrorist threat.
The Marketing Profession
Marketing experts are involved in nearly every aspect o f a CC/A, regardless of 
whether a terrorist threat has been given. The marketer’s presence especially is required 
during the unstable business climate created by a threat. From an ex ante vantage point, 
damage estimation turns on the ability to predict how the public will respond to a threat, 
and how the public will respond to marketing attempts to counter the negative effects of a 
threat. From an ex post vantage point, the impact of a threat to revenue streams is
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already known, although some contention may exist as to what could have happened if 
better management of the threat had occurred.
The Legal Profession
Within the context of a terroristic threat, the legal profession adds value for 
several reasons. First, and perhaps most obvious, the lawyer is expert in identifying 
liability risk, the expense of which must be included in the cost of a threat. Liability risk 
has two components that must be managed: legal liability and legal damages.
Frequently, if not always, the decision makers of an economic entity must know both 
what their duty of care is under the law to protect patrons, employees, and others in 
attendance, as well as which injuries trigger a legal obligation to compensate the plaintiff. 
Many courts, for example, have held that a storekeeper or proprietor of other commercial 
premises is generally liable for the willful criminal acts of a third party whose criminal
TOacts can be foreseen or anticipated (Caner 1995). Accordingly, if a proprietor receives a 
credible threat, then the threat is foreseeable and creates a mandate for reasonable 
preventative actions by the proprietor.
Second, a lawyer may provide useful advice on how to mitigate legal risk. 
Generically, under USA law liability flows towards those who control risk. Warning of a 
risk can shift some control o f the risk to the customers and mitigate the proprietor's risk. 
An example of risk mitigation might include a decision to advertise the exact nature of 
the threat and consequently shift the locus of the control and the risk.33
32 For an in-depth review of pertinent legal decisions in this area consult the American Law Review 
as cited in the bibliography.
33 Of course, such a decision can aversely impact revenue streams in the form of lost business and 
consequently would need to be balanced against other potential gains. An event with both low probability
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Lastly, some losses are not generically recognized by the respective local legal 
authority, and, if accepted, must be proven using scientific rules of evidence. This 
becomes especially important if the establishment or recovery of costs is expected via the 
courts. All expert testimony is now subject to screening to ensure that it is relevant and 
reliable, and the choice of proceedings to make this determination lies within the purview 
of the trial court (Federal Judicial Center 2000).
The Actuarial Profession
Actuarial science, which is most commonly perceived as part of the insurance 
industry, also may be of value when estimating the cost o f a terroristic threat. The 
amount of money an economic entity is willing to spend to mitigate the risk of such a 
threat likely depends on the probability o f occurrence. According to Warren Buffet, for 
example, the risk for landmark buildings in New York is 10 times that of buildings in 
less-populated areas (Samples, Miller et al. 2001).34 Presumably, actuarial science was 
used to establish this estimate (or they knew they could not know and thus substituted a 
quantum jump).
Actuaries potentially are useful estimating risk across varying categories of 
entities and structures. The 9-11 incident, however, demonstrated the insurance 
industry’s lack of experience with modem terrorist threats as evidenced by the 
unexpected catastrophic losses incurred. A more detailed discussion of actuarial issues 
follows in a later section.
and huge dollars losses that could trigger bankruptcy might be concealed from the public to preserve the 
revenue streams on the belief that shifting the locus of control and of risk is not profitable for the 
proprietor.
34 The defining attributes of a landmark building versus an average building are not given in this
article.
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The Security Profession
Actuaries focus on objective value as defined by statistics. Actuaries only are, at 
best, capable of predicting the probability o f loss and the probable size of loss if loss 
occurs, and not the specific locus of loss.35 A security expert may add value by 
predicting for any specific entity the likely source of threat, the likely modus operandi of 
the source, and the specific vulnerabilities to be mitigated. One goal, therefore, of the 
security expert is to assess vulnerability.36 The security expert enhances the accuracy of 
the actuary's statistical estimates by quantifying items to which the actuary's statistics do 
not speak. The analysis performed by the security expert will have cost implications as 
recommendations are implemented.
VALUATION ISSUES37
All valuation methods link back to market value. Regardless of the method used 
to value an economic entity, the process is complicated both by a volatile market and by 
market obsolescence. Conceptually, any valuation turns on the ability to predict present 
and future benefits, and to quantify those benefits in present-day dollars. From a 
textbook perspective, all of this sounds rather simple, but, in reality, quantification of 
many of the benefits and discount rates are highly subjective. The subjectiveness of the 
process is further increased as market volatility rises. With regard to a CC/A, income is
35 The problem of predicting both the probability of loss and the probable size of loss if the loss 
occurs is that this joint estimation is much harder for manmade sources of disaster than for natural sources 
disasters. This issue is explored later with actuarial issues.
36 A high-level example of how the vulnerability assessment process works can be seen by viewing 
the Anti-Terrorism Risk Assessment Guide produced by the Governor’s office in North Carolina. This is 
available online (visited 08/16/02).
http://www. nccrimecontrol. org/forms/terrorismselfassessment.htm
37 This section borrows heavily from research authored by Greg Ashley, MBA and Michael O’Hara, 
J.D., Ph.D. See Works Cited.
28
largely based on entertainment-based activities. Conventional wisdom regards 
entertainment as a subordinate priority for consumers when the economy is bad and, as 
such, income flows presumably are less predictable than for industries providing a staple.
Another issue has to do with obsolescence. Competition to attract sports clubs 
and other venues is intense in the CC/A business. Older structures lacking modern 
appearance, security, and facilities are at a distinct disadvantage because they are doubly 
attractive to the terrorist: they can be softer targets and can allow greater damage. 
Valuation Techniques
Smith & Parr (Smith and Parr 2000) discuss at length three methodologies for 
valuing assets. These are generically known as the cost, the income, and the market 
value approaches. Smith and Parr argue that any other method of valuation is essentially 
a variation on these three.
The cost method is a cost-of-replication approach. The cost method seeks to 
calculate how much money would have to be spent in order to replicate by some other 
means the exact bundle of benefits being valued. The cost-of-replication approach must 
be time sensitive. Obviously, most o f the benefits being replicated are occurring in the 
future, and thus require predictions about future cash flows to cost and from revenue. 
Theoretically, one could replicate all of the values of any economic entity by purchasing 
each component of value separately. With regard to a CC/A, for example, a would-be 
customer of a CC/A attempting to capture the same values o f a CC/A venue could, 
among other things, rent floor space at other venues to showcase products, buy 
newspaper, radio, and television ads to get exposure, or hire firms who specialize in
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public relations. In theory, no one would pay more for a CC/A venue unless the cost of 
the venue was the same as or less than the cumulative cost of buying the values a la 
carte.
A criticism of the cost approach is individual forecasts vary widely on the present 
value of future costs and revenue cash flows. Most going concerns, especially CC/As, 
have a large number of values requiring shopping at many different sources to replace all 
of them. A future cost estimate is required for each source used, and likewise the 
opportunity for error is increased. These errors may cumulate rather than offset, thereby 
swamping any forecast with its own range of errors. A second criticism of the cost 
approach is its failure to fully account for the risk (to the seller and to the buyer) that the 
future may not be as expected. A seller may not receive payment when due and the buyer 
may own a nonproducing asset. In other words, if the probability is high that a future 
benefit is not received, the cost approach cannot directly provide a lower corresponding 
value.
The income method attempts to compute all of the nominal income, present and 
future, expected be earned from the entity. If such a dollar figure can be found, then the 
buyer need only do a NPV (net present value) to arrive at current-dollar worth.
Assuming the prospective buyer already knows the cash outlay required to purchase the 
entity, an internal rate of return (IRR) can then be computed. The IRR can be used by the 
buyer to compare perceived risk with rate of return. In this manner, the income approach 
addresses the risk issue better than the cost method. The income method suffers from
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many of the same problems as the cost method, however, the income method offers the 
additional insight of the reward for risk issue.
The market value method seeks to avoid the unavoidable uncertainties and 
subjective inputs of the building blocks approaches inherent to the cost method and the 
income method. Instead, the market value method looks to the market for similar 
transactions and takes those market prices as a proxy for the value of the present 
transaction. In theory, any entity could be valued by this approach. One needs merely to 
find similar market transactions. Obviously, subjective inputs are not eliminated, merely 
moved from the future to the present. However, once equivalent transactions are 
identified, theory dictates that the amount of money that exchanged hands should be close 
in value.
The market value method is the preferred method of valuation when like 
transactions are rare, for example, naming rights deals. The preference for the market 
value method may have different motivations. For example, the preference for the 
market value method may reflect recognition o f the inherent flaws in the cost and the 
income methods, or may reflect reluctance to incur the workload necessitated by the cost 
and the income methods, or may reflect lack of confidence and a willingness to trust the 
past efforts o f others.
The market value method is criticized because transactions often are not 
sufficiently similar and because there are too few transactions in the marketplace to 
provide a representative sample. The market value approach requires arms'-length
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transactions, and a lack of an arms'-length transaction would in turn require compensating 
adjustments to maintain the accuracy of the market value method.
Valuation of Intangible Assets
The traditional method of valuing a business is mainly concerned with three 
economic components commonly referred to as plant, property, and equipment38 These 
are all tangible assets. A business is assumed by this method to be a combination of 
buildings, land, equipment, tools, vehicles, raw materials, works-in-progress, and finished 
product, each providing its own share of fair market value to the business. The sum of all 
this is said to be equal to the value of the entire firm. The dollar value of these so-called 
tangible resources is more easily determined as a result of known historical costs and 
other similar arms-length transactions in the marketplace. There can, of course, still be 
disagreements regarding economic value, and this is one reason, for example, why people 
often ask for more than one appraisal when buying/selling property. The range of this 
disagreement, however, typically is small when compared to the total value of the 
property. Chances are, if you own something that can be seen and touched, there are 
knowledgeable people who, with the aid of many other transactions in the marketplace, 
can accurately quantify the worth of your property in dollars.
Businesses, venture capitalists, and even typical stockowners (not to mention 
government taxing authorities39) have in the last century come to realize that substantial
38 Traditional valuation methods also may recognize the value of “good will” or “going concern,” 
although historically have lacked accurate ways to quantify these. The accounting profession will be 
wrestling with these value issues more in the future because Federal Accounting Standards Board 
promulgated FASB 142 that took effect in 2002.
39 See, American Bus. Info, v. Ear. 264 Neb. 574 (2002) and at 
http://court.nol.org/opinions/2002/august/augl6/s01-470.htm.
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value can exist in things that are not tangible. Some of the most familiar examples of 
intangible property (also referred to as intellectual capital or knowledge assets) are 
patents, trademarks, trade secrets, and copyrights. Each of these carries with it a strategic 
economic value to the business, and as such, has been recognized under law and 
protected in some manner. The importance of intangible property is rapidly growing as a 
result of what some have called the New Economy. The value of so-called knowledge 
property has in many people’s view outpaced the value tangible property.40
Intellectual property, like other kinds of property, also may be subject to loss in 
value as a result of a terroristic threat, especially if the threat carried out. Consider 
naming rights as an example. Everyone entering into a naming rights agreement is 
hopeful that favorable impressions are generated as a result of the transaction. 
Occasionally, though, some unforeseen problem or catastrophe can occur that risks 
linking the corporate name with something negative and undesirable. A May 23, 2000 
article written in the Charlotte Observer notes such a possibility:
In the 16 months since the Lowe’s home improvement chain paid $35 
million of the naming rights of Charlotte Motor Speedway, debris from an Indy 
racing wreck last May killed three fans and a pedestrian bridge that collapsed 
injured more than 100 fans on Sunday.
The incidents at Lowe’s Motor Speedway mark the first time a sponsor’s 
name has been affiliated with such tragedy since companies started buying the 
naming rights to sports facilities almost 15 years ago, experts in the business say.
The tragedies should not tarnish Wilkesboro-based Lowe’s image, but 
they will make other companies more cautious in future naming rights 
agreements, experts said (Klaff 2000).
For example, on 08/21/02, Ameritrade (online brokerage service) lists Microsoft’s capitalization 
as $280.8 billion while General Motors is shown as $26.7 billion (http://www.ameritrade.com).
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If a terroristic threat has enough credibility and is widely publicized, then some
consumers may begin to associate a CC/A name with the threat. Recall that most naming
rights contracts span a number of years. That is a long time to deal with public relations
damage if the name is continually associated with negative consequences.
LINKING THREAT TO LOSS
The attempt to link the threat of terror to specific losses is easy in concept but
difficult in practice. The level of difficulty turns on the level of proof required to
establish proximate causation, and on the nature of the threat itself. With regard to the
former, casual or anecdotally established causation may be a sufficient level of proof for
purposes of internal use by the economic entity. If, however, recovery of damages is
sought in a legal forum, then USA law requires a stricter standard.
Legal Standards for Recovery of Damages
There are really two issues needing resolution in a damage recovery case:
In order for damages to be recoverable, they must be proximately caused 
by the wrongful acts of the defendant. In addition, damages must be 
proved within a reasonable degree o f  certainty [italics sic]. A key word in 
the latter phrase is “reasonable.” In applying the modifier reasonable, the 
courts have acknowledged that it may not be possible to compute damages 
with 100% certainty. Therefore, some degree of certainty less than 100% 
is acceptable. Here the opinion testimony of an expert can be used to 
establish the reasonable limits of acceptability. In allowing some level of 
certainty less than 100%, courts recognize that, even for historical 
damages, the actions of the defendant may have permanently changed 
events so that one may never know exactly what would have transpired in 
the absence of such actions (Gaughan 2000).
Finding proximate causation becomes more illusive as the directness and 
credibility of the threat wane. If, for example, a CC/A receives a direct threat from a 
well-known terrorist group, and the threat is widely publicized, then revenues likely will
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drop sharply and in a manner rarely seen absent a threat. The infrequency of sharp drops 
in revenue absent other explanations makes the link to causation easier.
Economic Uncertainty
Damages may occur in the context of stable, nascent, or unstable income streams. 
Nascent and unstable income streams complicate both the proximate causation and 
reasonable degree of certainty legal requirements. Under these conditions, the need for 
expert testimony often is inescapable.
Revenue streams also occur in the broader context of the economy at large, local 
business conditions, and specific conditions within the respective industry of the 
economic entity. With regard to the former, an example of this impact can be seen by 
recalling the condition of the hotel industry discussed in an earlier section. The USA and 
European economy was softening even before the 9-11 event. While no doubt remains 
9-11 had severe impacts on the hotel industry, the question is still out on what percentage 
was caused by 9-11 versus what percentage was caused by a softening economy. 
PREDICTING TERRORISM AND CONSEQUENCES
Future patterns of typical crime often are predictable via past crime statistics. The 
typical genre of crime is repeated with frequency. Frequency of occurrence aids in 
prediction. Crime statistics are nearly worthless, however, as a predictor of terrorism 
because terrorism is not typical. As can be seen in Figure 3 (Appendix A), less than ten 
people were killed in North America during the five-year period between 1995 and 2000. 
While other hints of the impending, post 2000, the 9-11 attacks may have been available, 
crime statistics certainly was not one of them.
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Another problem complicating prediction of terrorist acts is the target-rich 
environment America offers. According to data from the USA population census taken 
in 2000, the United States has 49 metropolitan areas with populations over 1,000,000, 
and another 32 with populations between 500,000 and 1,000,000 41 Each of these 
metropolitan areas contains numerous large office buildings, heavily attended venues like 
those of a CC/A, and geographically dispersed critical infrastructure, all of interest to a 
terrorist. Even knowing in advance that terrorists’ target selection process is heavily 
based on ideology, predicting which specific target will be hit is more a matter of 
guesswork.
Quantification of Risk
Stan Kaplan and John Garrick (1981) authored an often quoted article on risk 
assessment that appears to be the prototype for much of the later research in the area of 
risk management. They consider risk to be a function of both probability and 
consequence. Concisely stated, they believe the following three questions must be 
answered to properly assess risk:
What can happen?
What are the chances of a happening?
If something happens, then what are the consequences?
Table 1 expresses this concept mathematically.
These figures were available as of 08/29/02 from the U.S. Census Bureau at: 
http://factfinder.census.gov/biy lang=en vt name=DEC 2000 SF1 U GCTPH1R US10S geo id=01000 
US.html
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Table 1
Kaplan and Garrick scenario, probability, and consequence list.
Scenario Likelihood Consequence
51 p \  x l
52 p2 x2
SN pN  xN
Using brackets to denote a set: R={<Si, pi, Xi>}, 1=1,2,...,N. 
Source: adapted from Kaplan and Garrick (1981).
Kaplan and Garrick probably did not author this work with terrorism in mind, but their
work is nevertheless broadly applicable to all kinds of risk. 42
Gordon Woo also has provided significant research in the area of risk, specifically
with regard to natural catastrophes, and more recently, with terrorist threats 43 Woo
attempts divide risk factors into more manageable components:
In the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of nuclear installations, which 
provides the methodological basis underlying insurance natural 
catastrophe modeling (Woo 1999), and more recently civil aviation risk 
modeling, the damage consequences of an initiating hazardous event are 
logically charted via a multi-branch event-tree. The process of 
systematically dis-aggregating [sic] risk into component elements, through 
an event-tree, is an important aspect of structuring a risk analysis (Woo 
2002).
In constructing an event-tree, Woo notes that four conditional probabilities need to be 
quantified:
We should assume any skillful terrorist has read the work of Kaplan and Garrick, and will plan 
attacks accordingly.
43 For additional reading on natural catastrophe risk see: Woo, Gordon. 1999. The Mathematics of 
Natural Catastrophes. London: Imperial College Press.
37
[1] Given that an attack is planned, what is the probability that there is 
some prior intelligence about it?
[2] Given that an attack is planned, and there is some prior intelligence 
about it, what is the probability that the intelligence is acted upon?
[3] Given that an attack is planned, and either no intelligence exists or 
else it is not acted upon, what is the probability that the attack is 
nevertheless detected by border guards, police or other security 
personnel?
[4] Given that an attack is planned, but remains completely 
undetected, what is the probability that it fails to cause significant 
loss due to technical or logistical shortcomings (Woo 2002)?
In its simplest form, the use of an event-tree is makes the complex appear 
simplistic. Even the component decisions o f an event-tree, however, often require input 
from respective experts especially since quantitative data may be missing or inaccurate. 
Insurance Company Perspectives
The actuarial concepts of risk, as frequently utilized by the insurance industry, 
offer another way to think about risk. General Cologne Re,44 a prominent reinsurer, 
discusses three types of risk:
1. Process Risk -  A measure of dispersion of an actual/observed 
outcome from a true mean value (or expected outcome). Example, 
the odds that a coin tossed 100 times will produce 40 heads and 60 
tails, when the expected outcome is 50/50.
2. Parameter Risk -  A measure of dispersion of error in the 
assumptions (parameters) about the mean. Example. Using the 
coin toss example above, the observer may incorrectly assume a 
“fair” coin, i.e., one not weighted to produce heads 40% of the 
time.
3. Model Risk -  A measure of dispersion of error caused by not
knowing or understanding the loss process. Example: on the
1,000th toss, the coin lands and stands on its edge. In this case the
http://www. gcr.com
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observer did not “price” for a third possibility (Ferguson, Reindel 
et al. 2002) 45
The 9-11 tragedy caused actuaries to rethink the concept of risk. Insurance 
companies, for example, often try to diversify their risk in much the same manner as 
investors do with their stock portfolios. By insuring a portfolio of many so-called 
uncorrelated lines of business, e.g., property coverage versus life insurance, insurance 
companies have historically reduced the potential of catastrophic loss. The 9-11 tragedy 
changed that by encompassing an estimated 23 lines of insurance in one event (Ferguson, 
Reindel et al. 2002). The 9-11 tragedy greatly reduced the potential value and security o f 
using diversified product lines. The insurers did avoid having the 9-11 attack on the two 
towers o f the WTC being classified as two events; instead, the court ruled it was one 
event (Starkman 2002). This reduced the insurer's losses because coverage limits often is 
by event.
In the interest of brevity, much of this quote was edited to reduce additional explanation of risk 
concepts.
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METHODOLOGY 
THE MORE SPECIFIC CASE
So far, most of the discussion in this research has been high-level and has, for the 
most part, purposely avoided the specific case. The intent now is to enhance the 
previously discussed conceptual framework of costing a terroristic threat by considering a 
less-obtuse example. The example will, nevertheless, still be less than fully specified and 
named for several reasons. First, no prudent economic entity would release much of the 
kind of data required for such an analysis for both security and competitive reasons. 
Secondly, even if such data were available, the analysis would require professional 
support resources far beyond the scope of this work. Lastly, even if all relevant data were 
disclosed and all professional resources were available, many hypothetical assumptions 
are required regarding the nature of the threat and its source. For these reasons, 
discussion of an actual entity and actual threat is impractical. As was mentioned at the 
beginning, a medium-sized CC/A in the Midwest will be used to illustrate cost issues.46 
A generic CC/A example provides sufficient specification for this discussion.
This generic specification of threat also is helpful for academic purposes. Unless 
the range of possibilities arbitrarily is restricted, the estimation of probabilities and 
outcomes, and subsequently relating these to cost, becomes unmanageable for purposes 
of illustration. In this regard, we presume direct threat from a foreign source widely
A medium-sized CC/A is defined as being between 250,000 and 500,000 square feet in size. An 
example of a large CC/A is the Anaheim Convention Center in California, which has 800,000 square feet.
40
assumed to have requisite resources to carry out the threat47 The historical preference of 
the source is explosives, but bioterrorism48 cannot be ruled out.
Moot Issues in the Current Scenario
In the absence of a direct threat, one of the first questions a CC/A should consider 
is its relative desirability as a terrorist target. As was noted earlier, metropolitan areas 
always contain many potential targets. The determination of what to spend to counter a 
potential threat turns in part by estimating, and subsequently ranking, target desirability 
from the terrorist’s perspective. Many targets do not have the ideological fit terrorists 
often prefer, or are sufficiently hardened to act as a deterrent. Of course, given the 
presence of a direct threat, target desirability becomes a moot point and requires the 
assumption of "desirable". Given the assumption that the CC/A is a desirable target, the 
question no longer is whether to spend for defense above routine levels, but rather how 
much to spend.
An analysis o f the terrorist’s ability to deliver an attack also is not required in this 
scenario. With regard to foreign terrorists, a CC/A located in the Midwest theoretically is 
harder to hit than one on the coast because of the logistics in transporting dangerous 
material over long distances. Whether the terrorist is foreign or domestic, if the source of
A direct threat in this context may be an expressed threat and/or those combinations of 
circumstances and conditions synergistically summing to equate to the same threat potential as an 
expressed threat. For example, a sequence of direct threats to CC/As in other regions may sum to equate a 
direct threat on the prototypical Midwestern CC/A.
48 "Bioterrorism" is a broad category that includes chemical weapons (e.g., chlorine gas), a dirty 
nuclear bomb (e.g., high explosives to create and disperse a radioactive cloud), disease (e.g., anthrax), and 
infectious disease (e.g., small pox). In addition to not ruling out bioterrorism, the cost structure and 
engineering difficulties associated with each delivery system may encourage bioterrorism.
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threat is known to have sufficient financial and other resources, their logistical barriers 
are of less concern.
Lastly, and as discussed previously, estimating the cost of a threat involves many 
professions; accounting, finance, economics, marketing, legal, actuarial, and security. 
After a direct threat exists, however, the scope of the actuarial and security professions 
has a much narrower focus. A direct threat removes the need for prediction of threat.
The tasks that remain relate to estimation of the losses suffered after a successful attack 
and estimation of the costs of prevention.
CATEGORIES OF THREAT COST
Breaking the cost of a threat into component parts may help to manage where and 
how costs attach. These costs can be roughly divided into five categories as shown in 
Table 2.
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Table 2
Categories of Threat Cost.
1: Education/Information/Intelligence
hiring of specialized security professionals
information regarding source of threat
information regarding most-likely kind of threat (e.g. bomb?)
2: Control of Risk
legal advice
analysis of financial impact
liability
3: Defense
prevention
surveillance
security personnel
hardening
4: Contingency Costs
first-aid: inventory and delivery staff
crowd control
5: Loss of Revenue
fewer venues
lower attendance
increased advertising
structural damage
insurance cost
Efficient and effective security spending requires knowledge of potential sources 
of threat, the methods of terror used by those sources, and intelligence regarding their 
current condition or status. This knowledge is required to find and evaluate specific 
sources of weakness within the CC/A relating to those threats and methods. The CC/A 
will rely heavily on security experts and public law enforcement entities to acquire this 
knowledge.
As mentioned earlier, owners of risk are at increased danger of incurring legal 
liabilities. The probability of legal liabilities (as distinct from the probability o f the risk) 
can be reduced by shifting the legal control of risk to the customers of the CC/A, i.e., the
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venue organizers and their attendees. This is primarily done by disclosing specific 
information about the threat. Such disclosure is likely to be private when given to the 
organizers and will need to be public when given to the attendees.49 Note that shifting 
the locus of risk increases the potential for lost revenues if organizers and/or attendees 
avoid the CC/A. Accordingly, costs are rarely avoided in total.
Cost o f defense may be significantly offset by involving all levels of law 
enforcement.50 Local, state, and federal enforcement agencies at a minimum can provide 
advice, and often have access to intelligence regarding the source and modus operandi of 
threat. In addition, given the political climate at the time of this writing in 2002, any 
threat from a known terrorist would likely result in every level of government providing 
significant protective surveillance and intelligence at no charge to the CC/A.51 The 
amount of protection offered also may increase if the economic importance of the CC/A 
or its venues are high for the local community or the nation.
Various contingency costs also are a moral and a legal requirement. These are the 
costs associated with preparations to handle post-attack problems. Examples include, but 
are not limited to, first-aid, crowd control, and containment of damage.
Even if the CC/A gives the organizer notice of the risk, that notice will not necessarily relieve the 
CC/A of legal liability for attendees' losses if the CC/A should have known the organizer's response to the 
notice of risk was insufficient. Additionally, even if the CC/A successfully transfers legal control of the 
risk and legal liability for the risk to the organizer and/or the attendees, then the CC/A still can be assured 
of being sued by all injured parties to verify that the transfer was successful. That litigation expense is an 
unavoidable fixed cost of the CC/A.
50 Notification of legal authorities is an obvious moral requirement. The intent here is to note the 
difference between legally required minimal reporting requirements and the solicitation of active 
involvement. A free society leaks information like a sieve. If the CC/A makes a disclosure of a known risk 
to local officials, then the CC/A should begin to expect unplanned public disclosures via rumor. Effective 
public relations may require the CC/A to make some public disclosure so as to minimize pressures 
generated by rumor. Soliciting active involvement of law enforcement is sure to come at a price no less 
than coordination of public announcements.
51 This cost becomes a taxpayer-bom externality of the CC/A.
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Lastly, the there is a significant potential for loss of revenue. A list of possible 
sources of loss is quite large. A few examples include fewer venues, lower average 
attendance, and increased insurance cost (if available at all)52. If  an attack is successfully 
carried out, long-term damage to the physical structures of the CC/A also may impact 
revenue streams.
Quantifying Costs Associated With Threat Categories
The process of categorizing threat costs makes the budgeting process more 
manageable. At a high level, the methodology involves employing those experts 
associated with each category of cost with the goal of developing the most accurate 
estimate possible. To this end, an approach similar to the event-tree discussed above may 
prove helpful. In a previous section, Woo’s event-tree was discussed as an aid in 
quantifying the chance of terrorists successfully inflicting major damage. The event-tree 
concept can be reworked with the goal of estimating cost. Such an example is shown in 
Appendix C.
Problems concerning insurance availability are discussed later in a section entitled “Specific 
Expense impacts.
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ANALYSIS
The discussion thus far has focused on the conceptual framework for costing a 
threat. Of necessity, demonstrating with a real-world example is not practical because of 
the paucity of academically suitable examples, a lack of entities willing to disclose 
information, and because of resource constraints. All o f this notwithstanding, a high- 
level discussion with the goal of getting closer to practical application is possible. One 
obvious goal of an entity facing a threat is to be able to predict the economic 
consequences. To this end, any measuring tool may be of value, including a heuristic. 
COMPARATIVE IM PACT
Ex ante consideration of costs associated with a terrorist threat begins with the 
assumption of greater subjectivity, and consequently less precision, than an ex post 
consideration. This, of course, is the result of the inherent inaccuracies in predicting 
future cost versus having experienced historical costs. Therefore, from an ex ante 
perspective, the management of a CC/A may consider using the ex post established loss 
faced by a like entity in like circumstances as a rough guide of what is to come. The 
likelihood of finding a like entity in like circumstances, however, is low. Note especially 
the small number of direct, credible threats received by U.S. entertainment facilities or 
even foreign based entertainment facilities.53 If  terrorist efforts are more successful than 
counterterrorist efforts, then the problem of lack of comparable entities/circumstances 
may change on a going-forward basis.
53 On Wednesday, 10/23/02, about 40 Chechen gunmen burst into a theatre in Moscow and took an 
audience of about 700 hostage. Russian President Vladimir Putin linked the attack to a broader offensive 
by Islamic militants connected to the al Qaeda terrorist network (Chazan and Whalen 2002).
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As of Fall, 2002, the best available comparison, which perhaps is Super Bowl 
XXXVI, is insufficient for all the reasons discussed earlier.54 Nevertheless, recall 
security costs were rumored to be double that of previous years. For an information- 
starved CC/A facing a threat, the ex post Super Bowl XXXVI security costs may be of 
some marginal value for planning and budgeting even though they are at best a heuristic, 
order-of-magnitude estimate.
THREATS AND THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Conventional wisdom holds that entertainment-related expenses (i.e., luxury 
goods) are more severely impacted during a bad economy than required staples (i.e., 
necessities) (McConnell and Brue, 1993). Being aware of several key economic 
indicators, especially those relating to income and spending habits, may prove useful in 
predicting losses or gains not only in a nonthreat environment, but also in a threat 
environment. Consumer reaction to a threat may, for example, work synergistically with 
a worsening economy to worsen consequences. Conceptually, the possibility exists 
consumer reaction to the effects of a terrorist threat may be different depending on the 
value of economic indicators such as the rate of employment and median income levels. 
More research is needed in this area, especially with regard to establishing the elasticity 
between economic conditions and consumer reaction to a threat.
PREDICTABLE VERSUS NON-PREDICTABLE COSTS
In addition to the event-tree concept discussed earlier, there may be additional 
value in sorting costs based on predictability. Upon the receipt of a threat, some costs are
See footnotes 13 through 15.
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nascent. In other words, these are costs that did not and would not exist in the pre-threat 
environment. Examples o f these costs are those related to acquiring intelligence and 
information about the source of the threat and the hiring of additional security experts and 
personnel. The issue of whether these costs are fixed or reoccurring is less important for 
this discussion than the issue of predictability. Even in an ex ante setting, the CC/A may 
be able to predict some of the nascent costs with greater precision than other costs such as 
revenue stream impacts. Many security-related commodities, for instance, are in a 
standardized product form and available at known costs.
Referring again to Appendix C, those costs in the box labeled 
“Education/Information/Intelligence” likely are the most predictable. All other costs 
depend to some degree on costs in the box labeled “Loss of Revenue”. The prediction of 
loss of revenue is really a prediction of consumer behavior. Consumer behavior often has 
been shown to be unpredictable. Therefore, for the conservative spender, there may be a 
tendency toward too little spending in the control of risk, defense, and contingencies.
This may be less than ideal if  such costs are perceived to threaten the economic health, or 
especially solvency, o f the entity. Establishing accurate prediction of revenue impacts 
from a threat is perhaps the most critical and yet subjective o f the cost components. 
Feedback from every available expert and data source is indicated.
SPECIFIC REVENUE IMPACS 
Lost Revenue
Lost revenue can take many forms. Perhaps the most obvious form of lost 
revenue is lower attendance at all or most CC/A events. Fewer bookings of conventions
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likely is another problem. Lastly, there may be problems drawing professional sports 
teams or even local collegiate teams. All of this may work to create large blocks of time 
where facilities go unused. Lower attendance at existing events, fewer conventions, and 
fewer collegiate or professional sports teams also creates the problem of lower 
concession sales.
To compound problems, some security costs may not be scaleable to smaller 
crowds. This is especially true if the CC/A has a security firm under contract and that 
contract was written under the premise of full occupancy. In this circumstance, the CC/A 
will pay the same fees regardless o f the occupancy rate.
Additional Advertising
Advertising associated with a CC/A is done at several different levels, not all of 
which are directly orchestrated and funded by the CC/A itself In addition to direct 
advertising by the CC/A, advertising may be undertaken by the public authority 
associated with the CC/A, affiliated sports teams, convention event sponsors, and perhaps 
even vendors. CC/As also are the beneficiary of free advertising as scheduled events are 
often mentioned by the media as part of their news service. The revenue-impacting 
reductions in utilization discussed in the previous section also have as a consequence a 
reduction in advertising. To counteract this reduction, the CC/A likely will have 
additional out-of-pocket advertising expense to make up for advertising typically not 
bom directly by the CC/A.
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Naming Rights Devaluation
If the CC/A has not yet signed a naming rights deal, then the value of those rights 
likely will drop. If  the rights have already been sold, then the holder of those rights likely 
will face a reduction in the benefits those rights produce. Part o f the value from a naming 
rights deal, for example, includes value gained from ad impressions.55 Although 
establishing the value of ad impressions is a complicated process involving a high degree 
of subjectivity, ad impressions are, nevertheless, thought to genetically engender positive 
feelings toward the sponsor of the ads, as well as increase the likelihood of consumers 
purchasing their products/services. Lower attendance equates to fewer ad impressions. 
SPECIFIC EXPENSE IMPACTS
The Building Owners and Managers Association (BOMA) recently conducted 
two surveys of their members regarding various issues concerning security.56 Both 
surveys are related to the terrorist threat.
Insurance Survey
This survey identifies a serious insurance problem related to terrorism. One 
quarter o f the respondents were unable to obtain insurance at any cost. Of the remaining
An ad impression is the presumed positive response gained when a marketer presents a company 
or product in an advertising context. This context may include ad exposure generated through radio, 
television, newspaper, signage, etc. Many ad impressions, for example, are generated by having a 
company’s name or logo displayed on in prominent places within the CC/A.
56 BOMA is a real estate organization whose stated purpose is to enhance the human, intellectual and 
physical assets of the commercial real estate industry through advocacy, education, research, standards and 
information. Information in this section borrows heavily from these surveys. The survey relating to 
security is available at the BOMA website. The survey relating to insurance is not available at the site but 
was available via a subscription email from Elevator World. Elevator World is an international news 
provider for issues relating to vertical transportation. The BOMA website is located at: 
http://www.boma.org/index.htm 
The Elevator World website is located at: 
http://www.elevator-world.com
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respondents who were able to obtain insurance, 80% reported higher premiums, caps on 
coverage, higher deductibles, cancellation clauses, and exclusions for chemical, 
biological, and radiological acts.
Even though a CC/A may be paying higher premiums, a direct terrorist threat may 
trigger a cancellation clause and force the CC/A to self insure. Public knowledge of this 
situation may further reduce attendance as public perception develops that the CC/A is 
unable to bear the cost of risk.
Security Survey
The respondents to the security survey indicated a greater concern for overall
emergency preparedness than with terrorism.
Survey respondents indicated far more concern with overall emergency 
preparedness than with terrorism. For instance, 56.9 percent of the 
respondents indicated security concerns over fire safety; 34.7 percent were 
concerned with civil unrest; and 32.7 percent identified power disruptions 
as a major concern. In comparison, only 11.9 percent acknowledged 
terrorist attacks as a potential threat, and 6.9 percent had concerns 
regarding biohazards. “Being prepared in general ... appears to be more 
important than concern over ‘one time’ or ‘unlikely’ events,” the report 
says (The Building Owners and Managers Association and Institute 2002).
Presumably, the 6 .9% of managers concerned with biohazards is a subset of the 11.9%
who consider terrorist attacks as a potential threat, or else a question is raised as to the
expected source of the biohazards. An interesting additional survey question would have
been to ask respondents about these issues within the context of a direct, credible threat.
The BOMA report also provides typical examples of expense as a result of the
9-11 threat, as shown in Table 3.
51
Table 3: Security Measures in Place Before and After 9-11
Did Not
Security Measures Had in Place Prior to 9-11
Added After 
Events of 9-11
Have in 
Place or Add 
After 9-11
No
Answer
Lobby Security Controls 74.3% 6.9% 18.3% 0.5%
ID Cards For All Tenants 41.1% 6.9% 48.0% 4.0%
Perimeter Barriers 14.9% 5.9% 74.3% 5.0%
Surveillance Cameras 64.9% 5.4% 28.7% 1.0%
Garage Security 42.6% 5.0% 50.5% 2.0%
Vendor Security Protection 52.0% 15.8% 30.7% 1.5%
Alarm Monitors 80.2% 5.9% 13.4% 0.5%
Employee Background
Checks 60.9% 5.9% 32.2% 1.0%
Other 1.5% 4.0% 69.3% 25.2%
Adapted from a BOMA security report (The Building Owners and Managers Association 
and Institute 2002)
The same BOMA survey goes on to list the ten major categories o f likely 2002 
new/expanded security expenses:
- Increasing the number and/or upgrading the quantity of security cameras
throughout the interior and surrounding the exterior of the buildings.
- Increasing the number and/or upgrading the quantity of security cameras
throughout the interior and surrounding the exterior of the buildings.
- Reviewing, updating and/or expanding emergency planning and
evacuation procedures.
- Increasing the number of security personnel.
- Adding identification cards for vendors and tenants.
- Adding, expanding and/or enforcing key card access systems.
- Implementing a more rigorous security system (i.e., “no more
exceptions”).
- Eliminating loading-dock parking and after-hours deliveries.
- Expanding security training for all property employees.
- Restricting access to various building areas to all but authorized
personnel.
- Implementing new security procedures in and around the mail room/mail
center area(s).
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Likely, this list was generated without the specific precondition of a direct threat, 
and consequently would be expected to grow in such a circumstance. Note too, 
establishing cost for these categories of expense is heavily influenced by the scale and 
architectural design of the facility. Cost also may be impacted by the speed of 
implementation required. The “rush job” that a threat necessitates likely will drive up 
implementation costs.
OFFSETS
In the event a threat is successfully carried out, many costs will undoubtedly be 
partially offset through the contributions and volunteerism of the community and 
charitable organizations, and perhaps government. This was demonstrated after the 9-11 
event. Unfortunately, the amount of these offsets can not be predicted in advance, and 
will not be fully known until long after the incident.
This kind of cost offset is not widely available before an incident occurs. Law 
enforcement may be one of the few "free" material sources of help available prior to a 
threat being carried out. For obvious reasons, the terrorist threat does not lend itself to 
the same kind of proactive volunteerism that, say, a hurricane does.
Minor adjustments to the marketing plan also may be helpful. Presumably, 
organizations, like people, differ as to their risk tolerance of terrorism. Focusing a 
marketing plan to those who are less risk averse may increase the percentage of 
successful sales contacts. Historically, risk aversion is not a typical trait marketers seek 
to quantify.
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For that segment of convention business expressly leaving because of a threat, the 
CC/A may be able to offer one of several cyber solutions. For example, Software 
Management, Inc. has filed for a patent for a system purported to conduct conventions, 
events, conferences, trade shows, and meetings via internet-based facilities.57 This kind 
of hosting can be completely virtual or allow the convention sponsor's programs, held 
within a real CC/A, to be viewed remotely. Although margins for this kind o f solution 
are predictably much lower than a face-to-face convention experience, some profit may 
be better than no profit.
In the recent aftermath of 9-11, the hospitality industry ran many ads appealing to 
the courage and patriotism of USA citizens with the goal of restimulating demand. Such 
an ad campaign may work to offset losses, however, often it is unclear in advance 
whether ad expense is greater than revenue from restimulated demand.
57 http ://www. conventionnet. com/about help, cfm
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CONCLUSION
Predictability of cost of a terrorist threat ex ante involves a number of subjective 
inputs. The amount of actual cost that unfolds depends on many factors which are 
primarily, but not exclusively, functions of source of threat, directness of threat, and 
consumer response to threat. There is a lack of structure in the linkage of these functions 
in the sense no hard rules have been found (e.g., if A, then B) to aid in the process of 
quantification.
Part of the quantification problem undoubtedly stems from a lack of experience in 
handling terrorist problems, especially from foreign sources. Historically, the USA has 
been shielded from foreign-based terrorist events because of two surrounding oceans and 
the logistical problems that causes for terrorists. The relative declining costs of 
transportation and communication, however, as well as an expanding openness in society 
has reduced this shielding affect. If a large number of terrorist events had occurred, then 
perhaps cost patterns would emerge, thus enhancing predictability o f cost. If  
counterterrorism measures are successful, as would obviously be the preferred case, then 
experience may never be gained.
The lack of terrorist events inspires a cost-related discussion to note several areas 
where more research is needed. First among these is consumer reaction to threat. What 
are the typical drivers of behavior for consumers facing a threat? Can they be predicted 
with sufficient accuracy, especially in the context of varying economic conditions? In 
addition, if terrorist events increase, then will a pattern of diminishing marginal returns 
evolve for the terrorist, or will consumer response increase drastically in a more direct
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relationship? What is ideal ratio of public versus private funding to handle terrorist 
threats?
The cost issue is not just an academic problem, but also has policy-related 
components. Can changes in public and private economic/political policy, for example, 
impact the number o f occurrences of terrorist events and reduce the need for large 
security budgets? On October 11, 2002, the USA Congress voted overwhelmingly to 
authorize U.S. military operations against Iraq, granting broad new powers to the 
president to confront and disarm Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (Kelly and Thompson 
2002).58 As of this writing, a war is not yet imminent, but if a war does ensue, what 
consequences can be expected as related to the domestic terrorist threat?
Despite the lack of available terrorist events to study, one fact appears obvious. 
Terrorist threats are expensive and represent a substantial economic threat to those who 
face them. An increase in terrorist events will undoubtedly require a broader public 
policy plan for dealing with the economic consequences.
Evidence has been widely presented by the USA, Israel, and England showing Saddam Hussein to 
be a supporter of terrorism and be in the possession of chemical and biological weapons of mass 
destruction. The status of Hussein’s nuclear capability is not known as of this writing.
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Appendix A: Terrorist Attack Statistics59
Figure 1: Total International Terrorist Attacks, 1981 -  2000
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Figure 2: Total International Attacks by Region, 1995 -  2000. (Note: North America 
had casualties only in 1997 and 1999.)
All figures in Appendix A were adapted from material produced by the United States Department 
of State located at:
http://www.state.gOv/s/ct/rls/pgtrDt/2000/2451 .htm
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Figure 3: Total International Casualties by Region. (Note: North America had no 
casualties during the period except for 1997.)
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Figure 4: Total Facilities Struck by International Attacks.
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Figure 5: Total US Citizen Casualties Caused by International Attacks.
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Appendix B
Acronyms Defined
9-11 September 11, 2001 and its consequences
ABC American Broadcasting Corporation
BOMA The Building Owners and Managers Association
C&C command and control (also C2)
CC/A Convention Center/Arena
ELF Earth Liberation Front
FASB Federal Accounting Standards Board
FDA U.S.A. Food and Drug Administration
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HAMAS Islamic Resistance Movement
IMF International Monetary Fund
IP intellectual property
IRR internal rate o f return
ISO Insurance Services Office
IT information technology
NFL National Football League
NPV net present value
NSSE National Special Security Events
NYC New York City
PETA People of the Ethical Treatment of Animals
PRA probability risk assessment
PTSD Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
URL Universal Resource Locator
USA United States o f America
WTC former World Trade Center in New York
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Appendix C
Cost Event Tree
Contingency Costs 
Itemize costs pertaining to:
- crowd control planning
- first aid
- damage containment
Itemize costs pertaining to:
- legal advice
- analysis of financial impact
- liability
Control of Risk
Given the results above show the threat is credible, subsequent 
decisions require multidisciplinary input The cost of that 
input can be apportioned by category of threat.
Itemize costs pertaining to:
- security expert
- prevention
- surveillance
- security personnel
- hardening
Defense
Education/Information/Intelligence
Given a threat is received, itemize costs pertaining to:
- hiring of specialized security professionals
- information regarding source of threat
- information regarding most-likely kind of threat (e.g. bomb?)
Itemize costs pertaining to:
- marketing expert’s estimate of lost business
- fewer venues
- lower average attendance
- loss or reduced use of physical structures
- may require economic expert
Loss of Revenue
